

An Analysis of Somalian Political Economy and the Influences Western Thought

INTRODUCTION

In the following paper, I will discuss two concepts regarding the Somalian experience as a Global South nation. Primarily, I will demonstrate the effects of colonialism on Somalia's political economy, then I will dive into the key political economy attributes of modern-day Somalia, and lastly I will explore Somalia's current development trajectory. My second task will be to analytically explore the archetypal characterization of Somalia as a "failed state" (Byrne, 2011, 1).

Throughout the paper, I will weave in arguments against the discourse labelling Somalia as a "failed state," highlighting the inconsistencies with this portrayal of Somalian society. My argument will not invalidate the many governmental and economic failures of modern-day Somalia, it will instead point to the harmful rhetoric that has curbed Somalian progress and decomposed Somalia as nothing but a state without a state.

COLONIALISM

During the so-called third wave of colonialism in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, the imperialistic tendencies of European colonial nations rested in the global expansion of capital flow (Burbank and Cooper, 2010). Determined to bring enormous, capitalist wealth to European powers, most colonial actors entered the imperialistic scene under the guise of globalization and left their respective colonial territories not as additions to the capitalist empire, but rather as fragmented and disillusioned societies wrought with economic, social, and political disparities.

Somalia was no different. The colonial presence in Somalia from the late 19th century up until 1959 influenced the newly-independent state and undermined its abilities to establish a stable and secure government. In the next section, I will focus on the three main errs of colonialism that held back Somalia's ability to effectively integrate into the global scene. These colonial errs include: fostering

increasingly volatile clan-based rivalries, facilitating widespread corruption, and establishing a line of discourse that would forever stigmatize Somalia's image in the global eye.

The Third Age of Imperialism

Starting in 1875, the third age of imperialism in Europe transformed Somalia as Great Britain, France, and Italy placed claims on the peninsula. Asserting an early dominance, Great Britain seized control of lucrative ports like Berbera on the Somali side of the Red Sea in order to further its own economic agenda of import/export capitalism. This shipping lane provided the perfect gateway between the British colonies in India and the east African colonies Britain was quickly laying claim to. As with most colonies, resistance movements began to break out against Great Britain and intense fighting began in 1899, led by the Somali revolutionary Mahammad Abdille Hasan (*Permanent Mission, I*). While Hasan facilitated years of guerilla wars against the British, the Italian portion of Somalia remained largely peaceful and began to establish a stable economic system. With the French cutting down their 'shares' of Somalia early on, the British and Italian colonies assumed full control of what is now modern-day Somalia.

Clan-Based Rivalries

As the British and Italians expanded their control over Somalia, the divergence in their approaches created a notable Italian-British separatism. Centering much of its colonial focus on Somalia, Italy was committed to developing a comprehensive economic plan for its colony (*Somalia: Colonial Legacy, I*). Located in the agrarian south side of Somalia, Italy began to foster the creation of a relatively stable economic system based on agricultural production. Hoping to gain greater control not only over its colony's economic systems but also its political and social groups, Italy created a system that put the existing leadership on the chopping block and uplifted cooperative, tribal leadership into power. This created a power structure that favored tribal hegemonies and concentrated political dominance in the hands of a few. Somalia, in pre-colonial times, was ruled by a system of alliances and communications between the numerous clans and sub-clans that comprised the geographical space. Upon this Italian

integration, these clans were forced into traditional hierarchical positions where specific clans were lifted up while others were excluded. This turned the clan rivalries into more than just political battles as economic and social power also were at stake.

While the Italians in the south continued to assert their dominance in all spaces, the British took a more lax approach. Not wanting to involve themselves with tribal dealings and simply utilizing the space of Somalia for economic exploitation, the British in the north used the land as a way to employ cheap labor, gain access to key trading posts, and increase the prevalence of Britain's export economy (*Somalia: Colonial Legacy, 1*). This approach left British Somaliland in shambles. With little economic control, the lack of a unitary government, no public goods or services, and limited infrastructure, north Somalia post-colonialism was visibly neglected. This key difference produced lasting disparities in wealth and power between the two colonies and informed future conflict between the regions as clans evolved into political identities. In 1960, the Italian and British Somalilands merged to form the Somali Republic. In no time, the south Somali region obtained de facto hegemony over the underdeveloped north and sparked the decades of regional rivalries and clan politics that would later ensue.

Regional Rivalries

The tribal rivalries soon developed into regional rivalries as the north and south had formed notably distinct regional identities. The extensive urbanization in southern Somalia expanded and many urban dwellers began to distrust the traditionally nomadic culture of the northern part of the country (Pier, 2021, 2). The Italians also left with them the legacy of a somewhat global economy while the British left the north so underdeveloped that the nomads were still largely participating in rural subsistence farming. These divided identities and clan allegiances left by the Italians and British indirectly undermined Somalia's ability to create a cohesive, stable post-war political form. Beginning its new life with an already-fractious parliamentary system, Somalia succumbed to intense inter-clan political warfare as clans aligned themselves with competing political parties. These inter-clan conflicts were further exacerbated as clan leaders were put into positions of power and subsequently unleashed reigns of terror against

opposing factions. In Siad Barre's case, the reign of terror came in the form of the Red Berets (a special unit recruited from the President's clansmen) (*Permanent Mission*, 2). The Berets discriminated and looted, building the structure of clan-based discrimination and rivalries so high that it toppled in 1991 when the northern Somalia declared itself as the independent Somaliland.

The Colonial Creation of Corruption

The colonial powers drew out of Somalia in 1959 with little regard for any structural disintegration they may have caused. Left with the absence of a functioning central government and little economic power, Somalia was plagued by corruption, including extortion, trafficking, piracy, and predation. Living in an economy with little regulation and no global fortitude, non-state actors such as militant Islamists, warlords, and pirates assumed control. First to enter the scene was the patronage system. This nepotistic job culture dominated the political, economic, and social scene from the moment the colonial powers took Somalia under their wings (Kapteijns, 2013, 226-240). The patronage system presented itself politically as clans simply handed off powers to their own clan members, concentrating political power in the hands of a few select clans. Patronage also presented itself economically, where investments were granted to many sections of the bourgeoisie, particularly those with state patronage. Lastly, forms of patronage also played out in social schemes as leaders of similar clans were able to gain more influence. This patronage-reward system deeply rooted itself in Somalian society and was further enforced by the Siad Barre era. As Somalia continued to be afflicted by the deeply entrenched patronage system, new forms of government, such as the Transitional Federal Government established in 2004, were legitimately undermined and stunted (Pier, 2021, 5)

The economic disarray left by the colonists inspired further, specifically economic, corruption. With a gaping vacancy in terms of the government's power and regulations, someone had to fill the space. In Somalia, warlords and pirates jumped to the scene.

Warlord Control

Warlords in Somalia took advantage of the absence of government to create a criminal economy. This was based on the ability of warlords to control and manage trade routes, dominate the sale of rights to access natural resources, and advance the smuggling of illegal goods. Warlords assumed control through their use of local militias, which they utilized to inspire fear and gain full control of many economical locations (Samara, 20). First, warlords gained control of main ports, airports, and runways. This allowed them to establish dominance in a specific location and then utilize their military power to tax goods and people transiting through these areas. These militaristic checkpoints were their main source of revenue and allowed them to further fund their militias and private interests. Warlords soon expanded their contraband businesses by creating checkpoints and tolls on roadways where they engaged in the extortion of funds and racketing to further bolster their economic return. Their increasing power allowed them to develop their militias to more than just military actors as they began to use their soldiers to export profitable local goods, including legal goods such as livestock and agricultural produce as well as illegal goods such as drugs and arms. Assuming such a control over the main economic entries and exits in the country essentially granted warlords limitless economic control, power, and freedom to exploit as they saw fit.

Pirates in the Modern Somalian State

Piracy, which was prominent in Somalia even in pre-colonial times, exploded in northern Somalia, specifically the Puntland region, as agricultural businesses were impeded by the growing globalization of agricultural production. With easy port access, many nomads turned to piracy for not only economic gains, but also to create a more centralized system in fragmented regions. With no government to provide basic goods and services, pirates took control and set up courts to resolve agreements, created bonds with local businesses, and even set up profit sharing plans. Piracy in the region became highly organized as the pirates provided goods, boosted local community services like healthcare, and assumed control of the justice and dispute-management system in many factory, military, and agrarian towns (Dua & Menkhaus, 2012, 6).

Most pirates operated by seizing a commercial ship, holding the people for ransom and, once the payouts were received, splitting the profits among those who participated in the operation as well as the local community to which the pirates belonged. As piracy substantially increased post-colonialism, it effectively became a central business and system of governance in many decentralized northern cities and regions.

Western Discourse

Through the thick and thin, Somalians were able to establish rudimentary political, economic, and social systems. However, to prosper, they needed to outlive the Western line of discourse outlined by Hall that would continuously undermine Somali political economy for decades in the future (Hall, 2011, 290-299). Scholar Ali Mumin Ahad says, “Sadly we Somalis ourselves have been formed on those colonial historical sources which have not always told the truth about social reality” (Ahad, 2019, 12). Colonialism created a fictional story, one that projected a false interpretation of Somalia as “failed.” According to Western thought, the secure state is one that is “developed” to Western standards (ie. industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, etc). This prototype of social progress not only furthered the hegemonic mindset that Somalia needed western aid to become more, well, Western, but it also dissuaded forms of progress from entering Somalia’s borders. No investors want to invest in a “failed” state, no companies want to establish themselves in a “failed” state, no Somalians want to remain in a “failed” state. All of these factors perpetuated the continued dissolution of the Somalian state and led to the political crisis in 1991, the economic downturn seen since the 1960s, and the continuous famines and humanitarian crises beating back Somalian progress one by one.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTRY POLITICAL ECONOMY

The current Somalian political economy is undergoing a massive shift and taking a major upwards trend as a direct result of a steadily-growing private sector. Nevertheless, the journey towards security and stability is far from over, and is informed by statelessness and an absence of public authority

that has been curbing economic and political progress since the 1960s. This next section will cover the many characteristics of Somalia's political economy post-colonialism and will shed light on the major economic and political issues that have informed Somalia's vision as "failed" and underdeveloped in Western thought.

The Somalian Debt Crisis

Colonies, such as Somalia, were meant to be integrated into the international economy. Creating these colonial economies, however, required the breaking of pre-existing economic and social relations. The colonial powers such as Britain and Italy did this in such a way where the future development of capitalism in their colonies, namely Somalia, was actually inhibited by the commodification of land and labour power. Capitalism bred a working class with no other commodity than labor power and created a global market that drove down global prices, created fierce competition for natural resources, and stunted the development of fair labor (Bernstein, 2010, 244). For Somalia, capitalism and globalization created a dependence on capital flow. As the Somalian economy was thrust into the global capitalist world post-colonization, a borrowing trend occurred where Somalia increasingly relied on Western aid to rebuild its economy. With more borrowing came more debt, and soon Somalia was imminently doomed to be forever indebted to the West and its global, capitalist regime (Djama, 2007, 4).

Limited Service Delivery and Security

The indebted Somalia now had little room for growth in either the economic or political sectors and little ability to provide basic goods and services. The absence of security provisions was markedly one of the most telling signs of the future lawlessness and statelessness that Somalia would experience. Following its independence in 1960, Somalia experienced a disintegration of national institutions, including civil service, banking, and protection (Norad, 2015). There was a major redistribution of power and those with military control and security measures came out on top. This allowed warlords, pirates, and powerful clans to seize control and essentially privatize security from within. This privatization of

security provisions was further augmented by the Siad Barre regime, where Barre created a militarization of Somali society that uncontrollably inspired the circulation of illegal arms and introduced a plundering culture led by none other than the Somali national military. Barre also completely disregarded investment in public amenities, roads, and infrastructure, putting budding businesses at a huge disadvantage. This left a gaping hole in both the political and economic power structures, allowing illegitimate actors to take control.

Political Instability

The political instability of Somalia is perhaps the most influential facet of its past and current political economy. Since 1960, Somalis have experienced coups, assassinations, overthrows, and even complete secession. An entire generation of Somalis grew up in a nation with a government that lacked central authority and failed to provide basic necessities to its people. In 1978, following the Ogaden War with Ethiopia, the African Union deployed AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) forces in Somalia to install a transitioning federal government (TFG) in the hopes of directing Somalia towards the creation of permanent political institutions that could foster greater national security and stability (Williams, 2014). Over the years, the TFG slowly dwindled away and was replaced by the Somali Federal Government, which has tried to improve securities and government infrastructure within the state. Despite all of these efforts, the political instability within Somalia cannot be repaired without one key component: money.

Without the state capital to pay civil servants and generate a strong national military, the Somali government has little to no power over the illegitimate political and economic actors that still largely control the state. With aid flows ten times higher than the government's own resources, Somalia's problem is revenue generation and expenditure. The federal government has been placed in massive debt to the West, and has little room to ask for more. The European Union recently said it cannot continue to fund the federal government and AMISOM, while the UN sent a small, meaningless support package (IMF Reports, 2020). With little financial or material resources, Somalia seems to be stuck in a rut.

Contrary to Western discourse, Somali entrepreneurs have started to work on several pilot projects that do not rely on Western aid. A few of these are amnesty programmes, weapons buy-back initiatives, and mechanisms to uplift the agricultural sector. AMISOM now has new goals as it wants to select a new federal government of Somalia, facilitate the creation of a functioning Somali national security presence, and peacefully restructure the Somali power grid. The core challenge now is to ensure the legitimacy of the federal government and begin generating sustainable revenue streams.

The Growth of Terrorism

The noble goal of generating revenue streams is difficult when terrorism wreaks havoc on national security. Al Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist group, rose to power in early 2006 as a powerful Islamist guerilla movement (largely inspired by foreign intervention from Ethiopia in 2006). The inadequate governance, particularly in the south-central regions of Somalia, allowed Al Shabaab to operate unfettered and build a secure network to train fighters and utilize them to pursue the extortion of funds at set checkpoints throughout the region. The lack of government-provided securities also led many to fall into the grasp of Al Shabaab as the promises of security, basic services, and nationalist uprising appealed to the Somali youth. In many areas, Al Shabaab played the role of a government by providing services such as policing, judicial decision-making, and even welfare. This gave Al Shabaab full control over much of the domain of government systems and allowed it to seize authority over local media outlets to further spread its propaganda. Al Shabaab hindered revenue streams by taking over many port cities, like Kismayo, and capturing goods entering through the port. Al Shabaab also created checkpoints across its territory to extort funds from passersby (Wise, 2011, 6).

Perhaps Al Shabaab's most notable funding scheme was its extortion of foreign aid and nongovernmental funds. During the 2012 humanitarian crisis and famine, Al Shabaab began extorting humanitarian organizations working to feed food-deprived Somali populations (Wise, 2011, 9). By squeezing aid funds and using them to pay for their own missions (such as military training camps), Al Shabaab directly led to the discontinuation of many humanitarian aid operations such as the UN World

Food Program. Future aid agencies and potential capital investment organizations became reluctant to provide services to the terrorist-linked Somali state, limiting the ability of the Somalian government to gain access to funds to further invest in its public services.

The Emergence of Clan Authorities

The lack of national security has not only given space to international terrorist groups, it has also furthered the ability of clan authorities to continue colonial systems of clan-based power structures. The Somalian state collapse that occurred in 1991 was a major turning point for the nation. Many urban Somalis fled home and disrupted many pre-established pastoral communities.

Despite the discourse that oftens claims Somalia to be a largely agricultural and rural state, urbanization in the capital of Mogadishu began as early as 1960. It became the center of attraction for jobs and social services, while also providing access to the patronage of political elites. Many Somali business firms recruited local militias to protect their goods and services from looters, which were thought to have come from the underdeveloped portion of northern Somalia where nomads and local pastoralists lived. This divide was utilized to give urban, economically-powerful clans an economic and political advantage. Clan authority soon became a foundation for the insurance system and acted as the only safety net following the state collapse (Kapteijns, 2013, 226-240). As people increasingly sought regulation and security from clans, the creation of local militias only grew. Soon, to be a powerful clan, one needed to have a militia associated with the name. This clan structure became incredibly important in Somali society and acted as a source of solidarity and unity. Witnessing an opportunity for personal gain, many clans took up the strategy of their hated counterpart, Al Shabaab, and began setting up checkpoints on the roads to extort funds and resources. Though the clan-based structure today operates on a much smaller scale, it still serves to inform major political and economic decisions.

Natural Resource Crisis

Colonial western ideologies seem to be only part of the problem for the Somalian economy as it struggles to gain its bearings amidst this new era of globalization. Historically, Somalia has largely been

an agrarian-based economy because of its rich store in natural resources. During colonial rule, the Italians created a system of commodifying livestock and fostering relationships between pastoralists, merchants, and the state based on this new form of livestock trade and production. Traditionally, Somali society had linked the rural and pastoral communities with urban communities through resource systems and trade routes. However, this new inroute connected urban and rural communities through the state, increasing the pressure for mass reproduction and diluting the capabilities of many pastoral communities (Samara, 8). Somali agricultural producers simply could not keep up with the intensifying demands of merchants and the state class. As the Somali pastoral community continued to struggle with the integration into the capitalist system, the globalization trend created a massive drop in the prices of livestock. This created stagnation of many livestock exports worldwide, especially in Somalia. Soon, the Somali state became strapped for foreign exchange and became immensely impoverished as other states began to produce and export cheaper livestock. Furthermore, embargos by importing countries in the Middle East brought livestock prices even closer to the ground as the productive sector crashed from an inability to compete with rising demands and lowering prices. With little other sectors to rely on, much of the farming population was dislocated and led to an influx of internally displaced persons.

As livestock production was further dismantled, the Somalian civil war was set in motion. Coupled with national dysfunction and an under accumulation of capital, Somalian enterprise suffered. During the turnover in 1991, the majority of leading businessmen fled the country, leaving the remainder of the country to plunderers hoping to profit from the chaos (Samara, 11). The presence of roaming militias grew and it became common for hordes of militiamen to destroy farming communities and primary infrastructure in many agricultural regions. Additionally, a huge sector of illegal trade developed, including illegal charcoal trade and the Bakaara-Mogadishu arms trade. As independent actors laid claims to urban amenities and factories for trafficking purposes, the local economy disintegrated and fell into the hands of those who could best exploit the circumstances.

Reliance on the Diaspora and the Remittance System

As some Somalians were able to move abroad and gain access to more resources and wealth, they utilized remittances as a way to invest back home in the Somali economy. Through the continued deterioration of the Somali central state, the economy became heavily dependent on remittances (Maimbo, 2006, 12). These remittances started with the first migrants who sent money home and grew as Somalia came to depend on the diaspora. The initial remittances were utilized for basic services such as food, healthcare, and education. However, the remittance industry soon grew and stimulated informal banking services and money transfer operations within the state (Maimbo, 2006, 13). Because of the inherent nature of remittances, oligopolistic enterprises such as money transfer operations and banking services began to luxuriate as Somalians came to utilize checking accounts to receive their international funds. As money transfer operating firms grew, more than one million Somalis migrated to the diaspora, remitting over 1 billion US dollars annually (Maimbo, 2006, 5).

As remittances have grown to become part of the backbone of the Somali economy, money transfer companies (known as Somali Remittance Companies) have increased international networks to offer reliable and inexpensive services. The SRCs, however, have been undermined by western discourse as many global banks have been reluctant to provide reliable banking facilities to SRCs. This has created operation challenges as most SRCs rely on infrastructure to operate and need to have some form of capital investment to carry out money transfer transactions. This further illegitimizes Somalia's industry and makes it all the more difficult for Somalians to gain international recognition and support in their future privatized ventures.

Though the legitimate Somali economy struggles to establish itself among the chaos, the growth of private sectors in Somalia (namely retail/service/production) has skyrocketed in recent years.

Entrepreneurialism and the Private Sector

The private sector has blossomed during this period of a deregulated economy, allowing many Somali businesses to make huge profits by paying little to no taxes to the government. At the end of the

90s, the banana industry (a then-huge industry in Somalia) dried up and many aid agencies and the UN withdrew their forces (Djama, 2007, 7). This loosened warlord control over the economy and allowed many big corporations to utilize the lack of centrality to settle in and develop businesses - particularly in Mogadishu. Private business owners capitalized on the corruption within the political system to strengthen their ties with politicians, allowing them to avoid taxes and even gain power over the decision making process. This created an explosion of Somali business actors and entrepreneurs that were strong in finance and livestock, and worked cooperatively to fight out the warlords that controlled the economy up until that point (Norad, 2015). Many of these entrepreneurial figures used warlord-like tactics to inspire the durability of their own companies, namely by investing in security. This, once again, placed power in the hands of those with powerful militias. In the interest of security and militaristic power, many businesses hired militias and utilized them to guard their operations and take control of local economies. Much like the clan-based groups, pirates, and warlords, the private businesses, through their political and economic power, began to fill in the gaps the government had formed. Budding strong, private businesses in the bigger cities provided basic goods such as private schools, hospitals, electricity, and financial services. This created a dependence on entrepreneurial businesses for security and services and also allowed many businesses to grow unchecked and unsupervised.

Many of the private markets and businesses were legitimate, supplementing agricultural production, livestock production, and finance operations. However, through this increased power, many businesses began to invest in illicit export sectors such as charcoal and contraband sugar smuggling into Kenya and Ethiopia (Kaptein, 2013, 226-240). The Bakaara market in Mogadishu became the center for this illegal trade and its markets experienced an influx of counterfeit products and currencies. This illegal sector boosted the wealth of many local businesses and allowed them to become key investors and players in the local economy. However, once again, Western ideology and associations of the illegal sector with the legitimate industries stunted legitimate industrial growth as the exiguity of international support penalized the import-export trade many companies attempted to establish. This lack of banking

infrastructure and services made it difficult for companies to accumulate credit and receive large enough sums of advanced money to buy goods for resale and vice versa.

DOMINANT IDEOLOGIES OF SOMALIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Laid out above are the dominant political economic trends and development strategies in modern-day Somalia. With the disastrous influences of colonialism, Western discourse, and globalization undermining Somalia's journey towards reconstruction, we must now understand these major developments from an ideological perspective.

The current Somalian developmental methods involve a global, increasingly neoliberal engagement paired with a growing entrepreneurial state (one of the main models of development described by Westad, 2006). This mix is also heavily influenced by existing ethnic and clan-based political regimes. Over the past ten years, Somalia has taken large steps towards improving its development strategy by limiting the prevalence of war politics and rebuilding many of its crumbled political and governmental institutions. World Bank data supports these positive trends by showing improvements in overall life expectancy as well as an increase in GDP figures. In fact, between 2012 and 2014, Somalia's real GDP grew by 3.7% (World Bank, 2017), despite the famine in 2011 that wreaked havoc across the nation.

Shifting Towards a Growing Private Sector

These evidence-based improvements are largely the result of shifting Somalian development strategies towards a growth in the private sector. Increased investments in construction, telecommunications, and money transfer groups have facilitated a new power structure - one that places the power in the hands of entrepreneurs rather than militant clan-based factions and warlords. This blossoming of the entrepreneurial private sector has also boosted the original modes of Somalian production (livestock and fisheries) (*Somalia Rising*, 2016). Over the past few years, the Somalian agrarian economy has rebuilt itself, exporting over 5 million livestock to markets in the Gulf States. This solely contributed nearly 40 percent to Somalia's GDP (*Somalia Rising*, 2016).

Adding to these improvements, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently recognized Somalia and has taken crucial steps to provide aid to Somalia under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (*IMF reports, 2020*). This recognition marks a major turning point because Somalia can now seek financial assistance despite its long standing arrears. The IMF recognition in 2020 has already reduced Somalia's debt from 5.2 billion US dollars to nearly 557 million (*IMF reports, 2020*). It has also allowed money transfer companies and banks to begin legitimizing their operations and further facilitating the remittance system.

A Speculative Analysis of Western Discourse and the Somalian State

Given by the colonial, political economy, and development strategy analyses provided above, I conclude with a speculative trajectory that "state failure" for Somalia is inherently inaccurate. Characterizing Somalia as failed without an understanding of its identity, inner workings, and history is just the neoliberalist way of stating that Somalia does not fall under western market-oriented assumptions about what a successful state should look like. This western theory, as often emphasized by Westad, is based on an ideal notion of what a state should be (ie. free market and global) rather than what its own identities and processes allow it to be.

The misrepresented social conditions of the Somalian state ignore Somalia's recent path to recovery. A true characterization of Somalia cannot be that of the failed state; it must be freed of ignorant Western ideologies about statehood. Rhetoric surrounding the state must begin to align itself with the Somali identity and provide room for the people themselves to be part of the solution to the reconstruction of their own - uniquely Somali - state.

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